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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union countries have been trying 
to form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the European Union 
unification process. The efforts to create "separable but not separate" European forces 
within NATO have accelerated in the last three years and changed direction toward 
creating an autonomous "European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)" within the 
framework of the EU. This policy concerns some non-EU European NATO allies, such 
as Turkey, and Norway, as well as non-European NATO allies, such as the United States 
and Canada. 
The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the 
French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have profoundly changed the discussion of an 
all-European force. The ESDP is an evolving process. The impact of the latest 
developments on Turkey's position in the European security system and Turkey's 
security policies is significant. Turkish vital national security interests compel it to be 
part of a new European security system and of security arrangements in the post-Cold 
War era. Turkey should have some institutional links to European Security and Defense 
Policy that would enable it to influence the decisions of its European counterparts on the 
matters that could affect Turkey's interests. European security cannot be provided 
without Turkey. How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend 
on its European membership process, its unique geostrategic position and its special 
relationship with the United States. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the French- 
British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have profoundly changed debate about the possibility 
of creating an all-European force. By expressing its willingness to have a sound European 
military to deal with post-Cold War security problems, the United Kingdom with its pro- 
European "New Labour" government, became one of the leading actors in promoting a 
common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This fundamental change in UK 
policy toward the ESDP was a watershed event in the evolution of the ESDP since the 
United Kingdom had been the most ardent opponent of such an EU project. 
The possibility of an all-European security and defense structure also has started 
discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. The discussion focused on the feasibility of such 
a posture as well as the ESDP's possible impact on NATO. As the leading member of 
NATO, the United States maintained the approach that the ESDP should eschew the so- 
called "three D's": decoupling, duplication, and discrimination. 
The ESDP is an evolving process. The uncertainties of the new security 
environment and the institutional ambiguities of the ESDP are the major reasons creating 
the discussions about its feasibility. The warnings that the ESDP should not create new 
institutions in the European security system, but rather should focus on increasing the 
capabilities overlook the importance of institution-building for the European integration 
process. The latest developments have clearly revealed EU members' political will to 
construct an autonomous ESDP. The most significant consequence of the process starting 
with St. Malo is that today the EU has a much more "autonomous" prospect of European 
xi 
security and defense identity in comparison to what was envisaged with the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) back in 1994. The efforts, which were first started 
within NATO to create "separable but not separate" European forces, have accelerated in 
the last three years and shifted toward creating an "autonomous" ESDP within the 
framework of the EU. These developments particularly concern some non-EU European 
NATO allies, such as Turkey, and Norway and non-European NATO allies, such as the 
United States and Canada. 
In the Turkish case, the issue is more complicated. Considering the latest 
developments, the ESDP affects Turkey more than any other member of the Alliance. 
Turkish national security interests compel it to be a part of a new European security 
system and of security arrangements in the post-cold war era. Turkey should have some 
institutional links to European Security and Defense Policy allowing it to influence the 
decisions of its European counterparts on the matters that could affect Turkey's interests 
directly or indirectly. In this regard, any form of Turkish exclusion from a European 
security system, if coupled with her political marginalization from the European 
unification process, could lead Turkey to pursue its interests unilaterally. 
European security cannot be provided without Turkey. In terms of collective 
defense, the end of the Cold War has changed Turkey's strategic importance for 
European security. However, it still can help stabilize a region which is evolving into one 
of the world's most problematic areas. 
How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend on its 
European   membership   process,   its   unique   geostrategic   position   and   its   special 
xii 
relationship with the United States. As long as Europe needs NATO and the United 
States for its collective defense, it will also need to consider Turkey's concerns and 
demands and try to integrate Turkey to the new ESDP structures. Turkey should not 
expect to secure a full role in the decision-making process of the ESDP, as it wanted, 
since the ESDP is an EU project and EU countries would never grant a full role in 
decision-making to a non-EU member in order to preserve the EU institutions' autonomy. 
Likewise, the EU should not expect Turkey to agree on automatic access to NATO 
planning structures and assets and to remove its veto, as it wanted, since this would mean 
a dilution in Turkish membership in NATO. The Turks will not agree to a second-class 
status in the Alliance. Both sides have legitimate arguments, both sides need to 
reconsider their positions and both sides must compromise, if a solution is to be found to 
the current problem between the EU and Turkey. 
xm 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, European Union countries have been trying to 
form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the European Union 
unification process. The efforts- to create "separable but not separate"1 European forces 
within NATO have accelerated in the last two years toward creating an autonomous 
"European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)." This policy concerns some non-EU 
European NATO allies, such as Turkey, Norway and non-European NATO allies, such as 
the United States and Canada. This thesis explores this process in detail. 
The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the 
French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have changed the discussion of an all- 
European force. By expressing its willingness to have a sound European military 
capability to deal with post-Cold War security problems, the United Kingdom with its 
pro-European "New Labour" government, became one of the leading actors in promoting 
a common ESDP. This profound change in British policy toward the ESDP has triggered 
what may be called the "St. Malo Process." This process not only accelerated the move 
toward a more "autonomous" European security and defense posture but also started an 
expansive discussion about the feasibility of such a force, its possible impact on the 
future of NATO and on the transatlantic relationship. This thesis examines the underlying 
1
 The term "separable but not separate" was first used by former US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in 1992 and then at the 1994 Brussels Summit, the term entered into official NATO language. 
See the Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council,  11 January 1994, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.nato.int>. 
1 
factors, which started the St. Malo process, with a special emphasis on the UK's role and 
the feasibility of such a defense posture. 
This thesis also examines the impact of the latest developments on Turkey's 
position in the European security system and Turkey's security policies. Because of its 
geostrategic position, Turkey has been a strategic partner for European countries and 
especially for the United States for a long time. Though the end of the Cold War changed 
Turkey's strategic importance for European security in terms of collective defense, 
Turkey is still an important factor in stabilizing the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, and the Caucasus. 
Turkish vital national security interests compel it to be a part of a new European 
security system and of security arrangements in the post-cold war era. Turkey should 
have some institutional links to European Security and Defense Policy that would enable 
it to influence the decisions of its European counterparts on the matters that could affect 
Turkey's interests. This thesis further suggests that European security cannot be provided 
without Turkey. Turkish exclusion from a European security system, if coupled with its 
political marginalization from the European unification process, could lead Turkey to 
pursue its interests unilaterally. This could create strains in the relations between Turkey 
and Europe. Turkey's integration into the new European security system is essential for 
Turkey, but equally essential for Europe and North America. 
B.        METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
The methodology used in this thesis relies mainly on a qualitative analysis of 
primary sources, including communiques, treaties, and transcripts of government policy 
Statements. It also draws upon secondary resources, such as scholarly and journalistic 
analysis of core issues. 
The thesis has two main sections dealing with two main topics. The first section, 
comprising the second and third chapter, examines the ESDP's evolution and feasibility, 
its position vis-ä-vis the United States, while the second section discusses the ESDP's 
impact on Turkey's position in the European security system and the Turkish security 
policies. 
Following Chapter I (Introduction), Chapter II provides information about the 
ESDP. The chapter starts with a brief examination of the evolution of the idea to develop 
a European security system since the attempt of the European Defence Community 
(EDC) in the early 1950's to the EU efforts of the 1990s. It then focuses on the latest 
developments that have occurred over the last two years. Chapter II also discusses the 
circumstances that led to the idea of a European force that would deal with contingencies 
such as Bosnia and Kosovo. This chapter emphasizes the significance of Kosovo in 
inducing Europe to establish an effective system and to acquire the capabilities to cope 
with such problems. It further discusses Britain's and France's position vis-ä-vis the 
ESDP and their roles in the latest developments. 
Chapter III examines the feasibility of the ESDP and the reasons for being either 
optimistic or pessimistic about the ESDP. This chapter also discusses the obstacles 
hindering a sound ESDP, as well as the factors that could help to reach such a goal. It 
touches upon the capability gap between the United States and its European allies and the 
need to close this gap. Furthermore Chapter III also discusses US policy toward the 
ESDP since this policy would have a decisive affect on the fate of ESDP. 
While the first three chapters provide a general overview of the factors affecting 
the realization of the ESDP and analyze the latest developments, the following two 
chapters deal particularly with Turkey's role and position in the European security system 
and the impact of the latest developments on Turkey. Chapter IV investigates Turkey's 
place in the European security system and its strategic importance for regional as well as 
global security. The chapter gives a general overview of Turkey's commitments to 
Europe's defense and security and the impact of the latest developments in the European 
security structure on Turkey. It also touches upon Turkey-EU relations particularly 
stressing the triangular relationship between the EU, Turkey and the US. 
Chapter V examines Turkey's policy toward the ESDP and if realized, the 
ESDP's possible impact on Turkey. Turkey as a member of NATO has been a part of the 
European security system for nearly 50 years, and it still regards being a part of the 
European security system as essential for its security interests. However, Turkey has 
growing concerns about its position in the changing architecture of the European system 
and is attempting to secure a place in the new system. This chapter examines how these 
changes in the European security system could affect Turkey, what concerns it has, how 
justifiable they are, and what the consequences for Turkey and Europe could be if Turkey 
were excluded from the new security arrangements. 
The thesis concludes with the presentation of its findings about the feasibility of 
the ESDP and its possible impact on Turkey. 
II.     EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) 
A.       FROM EDC TO ESDP: 
The idea of an all-European force dates back to May 1952 when France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the three Benelux states signed the European 
Defense Community (EDC) Treaty, inspired by the Pleven plan, named after French 
Defense Minister, Rene Pleven. In 1950, he called for the creation of a European Army. 
The EDC was designed to save resources, to improve effectiveness, and to limit the 
power of Germany to make war by denying it a General staff and separate armed forces. 
The French believed, the German rearmament and a national army, which was deemed 
necessary if Germany joined a European defense organization like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), could only be acceptable if it were within a supranational 
body like the EDC, in which the German forces would be integrated to and controlled by 
a European Army. The EDC would operate under a European defense minister, who 
would be responsible to the European Assembly and a European Council of Ministers 
and have a common budget.2 
However, the incorporation of defense into a supranational format was a leap too 
far and too soon for 1950s Europe. Despite the strong support and pressure of the United 
States, which hoped the project would strengthen NATO by strengthening Western 
European unity and by increasing the effectiveness of limited European resources 
allocated for defense,3 the project was shelved in 1954. Although the EDC project failed, 
2
 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (New York, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 38. For French proposals on EDC see also David S. Yost, 
NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 1998, p.30. 
3
 For US approach to EDC see John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe, Cambridge 
5 
the notion of having an all-European force and the discussion of the potential effect that 
such a force could have on the transatlantic alliance never died. Most of these discussions 
were initiated by France, which has always favored a Europe more independent from the 
US and has viewed such a force as a tool to realize this goal. There were numerous failed 
attempts to establish an all-European force: 
Western European Union (WEU)(1954), 
the Franco-German Treaty (1963) 




EUROCORPS (1992-first established as a Franco-German Corps following the 
Bilateral Brigade established in 1987.)4 
Albeit the form and configuration of the European force and the degree of support 
behind it, and the various players' perceptions of the controversy over such a force varied 
somewhat from time to time, the main themes of the issue have always remained the 
same. Representing the extreme sides of debate, the United States tended to view these 
efforts as a tool to increase the European share of the European defense burden and tried 
to channel them into a form that would strengthen the transatlantic alliance and at the 
same time not threaten the US leadership in the alliance while France viewed the efforts 
as a way of having a more independent Europe by gradually decoupling the United States 
from Europe. The attempts after the EDC to create a European defense structure such as 
the WEU, the Franco-German Security Treaty or EUROGROUP failed to achieve the 
French ambitions. This was true, in general, because the Cold War made a reliable 
University Press, New York, 1996, pp.301-329. 
4
 Ian Thomas, pp. 38-46. 
6 
European defense structure created by only Europeans unthinkable and because most 
Europeans feared that such a European force might decouple the United States, from 
Europe and put their collective defense, security and stability in danger. 
Because of these concerns, instead of moving toward being an independent 
European army, the development of European security identity proceeded hand in hand 
with the development of NATO in a mutually reinforcing course. NATO represented the 
outer ring of European security structures while the WEU and the NATO European pillar, 
which found additional expression in the NATO EUROGROUP, were playing a 
supporting, subservient role. However, the end of the Cold War brought a new unstable 
security environment in which the Soviet threat was gone, the dependence on the United 
States for European defense was decreased, and the need for a high readiness level for 
collective security problems such as peacekeeping and peacemaking missions was 
increased. This situation seemed to offer the possibility that the European members of 
NATO, acting under the WEU and later ESDP, would seek to distance themselves from 
American leadership.5 
Accordingly, after the Cold War, the efforts accelerated to have an independent 
European force as one pillar of the European unification that would enable the European 
Union to become an international player on the "political/security field" and make its 
voice heard. The inability of the European countries to react and to participate 
unanimously in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) in the beginning and the subsequent US 
dominance in the Gulf War underlined the fact that the European countries were in dire 
5
 Ibid p. 169. 
need of adapting their security institutions and acquiring military capabilities to the 
challenges of the post-Cold War world.6 
In December 1991, the members of the European Community signed the 
Maastricht Treaty, transforming the European Communities into the European Union 
(EU), and setting the goal of establishing a monetary union and a common currency, the 
Euro. The treaty was also a European response to the changing European security and 
defense environment including, as part of that Union, a commitment to "define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy" that would eventually include the 
"framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." 7 
The treaty designated the Western European Union as the organization 
responsible for implementing defense aspects of the EU's decisions on foreign and 
security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed (in Petersberg, Germany in 
1992) that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in humanitarian and 
rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement—the so-called 
"Petersberg tasks."8 The new Franco-German Corps—to become the core of a "Euro- 
Corps"—which was created just before this meeting, would be excellent for carrying out 
these tasks. 9 
6
 For the impact of the Gulf War on the evolution of the post-Cold War European security architecture 
see Gulnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War, St. Martin's Press, LLC, New 
York, 2000, pp.97-114. 
7
 Treaty on European Union, Available [Online] < http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex,/en//treaties/dat/eu cons 
treaty en.pdf > 
8
 Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992. 
Available [online]: < http:.-7www.weu.int/eng/conini/92-petersberg.htm > Accessed on February 17, 2001. 
9
 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of a New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey's Atlantic 
Documentaries, 1997, p.56. 
8 
With these developments transpiring, the relationship between the WEU and 
NATO started to concern the United States. Reflecting these concerns, US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher warned Europeans in 1993 that "there must be separable but 
not separate capabilities" that would enable Europeans to conduct such tasks and US 
officials in NATO maintained this approach.10 Additionally, in the preparation period of 
the Brussels summit, at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, 
Germany (October 1993), the US side proposed the "Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)" 
as a new Alliance concept to meet both Alliance and WEU force requirements for out-of- 
area operations. However, this concept would evolve and lie dormant until 1996 before 
being fully accepted as an Alliance concept.11 Nevertheless, NATO's Brussels 
declaration of 11 January 1994 supported strengthening the European pillar of NATO 
through WEU. It outlined the concept of "separable but not separate" capabilities, the 
need for better coordination and planning, and the furtherance of the emerging European 
security and defense identity (ESDI) that would enhance the ability of the allies to work 
together toward a common defense and other tasks.12 
Owing to developments in the first half of 1990's, both the United Kingdom and 
France were arriving at similar conclusions about the future of European security by the 
mid-1990's. This was partly because of their joint experiences on the ground in Bosnia, 
the growing reluctance of the United States to be involved in European security 
problems, and the fear of Congressional swings toward either isolationism or a new 
10Ibid,p.74-75. 
11
 Ibid, p. 76. 
12
 The Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.nato.int>. 
9 
burden-sharing debate.13 Furthermore, due to the requirements of interoperability, 
command and control procedures that surfaced during these years, a politico-military 
consensus also emerged in France favoring a closer link to NATO. The needs of the post- 
Cold War environment had necessitated a serious rapprochement for practical 
cooperation with the Alliance.14 
In the second half of 1995, the British government began actively searching for 
ways to create a European security and defense identity within the framework of the 
Alliance, and in a fashion that would facilitate France's return to a full military 
integration in NATO: (the British long-standing dissent to the idea of autonomous 
European defense system will be discussed later). Early in 1996, both the French and 
British governments proposed what became known as the "Deputies Proposal."15 NATO 
forces in Europe have always been commanded by an American officer who occupies the 
position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The British and French 
suggested that the Deputy SACEUR, traditionally a senior European officer, and other 
European officers in the NATO command structure, wear WEU command hats as well as 
their NATO and national command hats. This multiple-hatting procedure would, without 
duplication of resources and personnel, permit the Western European Union countries to 
use the NATO command structure to organize and to command a military operation 
under largely European auspices.16 
13
 Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?" Chaillot Paper 43, 
(Institute for Security Studies Paris, November 2000) p.23. 
14
 Ibid, p.23. 
15
 Stanley R. Sloan "The United States and European Defence" Available [online] at < http:// 




At the spring 1996 session of NATO ministers in Berlin, Germany, the NATO 
foreign ministers once again agreed on a plan to build a European defense pillar inside 
the NATO Alliance. They reiterated that an ESDI (European Security and Defense 
Identity) would be created within the Alliance by making NATO "assets and capabilities" 
available for future military operations commanded by the Western European Union. 
Such decisions would be made by consensus on a case-by-case basis, meaning there 
would be no automaticity. To facilitate such operations, European officers in the NATO 
structure would, when appropriate, shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU 
command positions.'7 
Additionally, as put in the final communique, the ministers determined that 
adapting the Alliance to the post-Cold War roles should be guided by three fundamental 
objectives: 
• to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness and ability to perform its traditional 
mission of collective defense while undertaking new military roles; 
• to preserve the transatlantic link by strengthening NATO as a forum for political 
consultation and military cooperation; 
• to support development of an ESDI by creating the possibility for NATO-supported 
task forces to perform missions under the direction of the WEU nations.18 
The communique also emphasized the issue of participation: "As an essential 




 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, 3 June 1996, Available 
[Online]< http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm > 
11 
participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if 
they were so to choose."19 
In 1996, NATO also adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a 
"deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific 
contingency operations," after three years of discussion since it was first introduced in 
Travemiinde (1993). Thus, through the CJTF, forces assigned to NATO and trained in 
NATO exercises could be used in conjunction with or entirely for WEU operations. This 
linkage of the WEU's operational role to NATO has resulted in "separate but not 
separable" capabilities, to be used either by the WEU or NATO.20 
However, even after Berlin, the question was what military operations the 
European Allies could actually assume within the framework of the new arrangements. 
Despite "the hour of Europe"21 rhetoric articulated by some EU (then EC) officials, the 
intervening years have demonstrated that they lack the combination of military resources 
and political will to take on operations like IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia, and the United 
States provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia in 1999.22 In 
1997, when impending chaos in Albania threatened to destabilize southeastern Europe, 
the Europeans were not even able to agree on organizing an intervention under the 
Western European Union. If this had been done, the operation could have been a perfect 
19 Ibid. 
20
 Munewer Cebeci "A Delicate Process of Participation," November 1999. Available at 
http://www.weu.int/ institute/occasion/occ 1 Ox.htm Accessed on Oct 31, 2000. 
21
 This refers to Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers (then), 
Jaqu Poos' speech on June 28, 1991, in which, referring to the Bosnia problem, he said, "This is the hour 
of E ape not of the Americans, if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav 
problem," quoted in Yost, NA TO Transformed, p. 193. 
22
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Petersberg-type mission with WEU members, acting under the authority of the WEU for 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management and 
peacemaking. But, the Alliance solidarity within the WEU was not strong enough to 
trigger institutional support. Not only the UK but also Germany opposed the request of 
the Southern European members that a Special Session of the WEU Council be convened 
to grant the WEU the authority of the military operation.23 Thus, instead of a WEU force, 
an Italian-led ad hoc coalition force (7,000 troops from Austria, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey) intervened under the name of Operation 
Alba.24 All these experiences have led observers to bemoan the fact that Europe does not 
have the military capacity required to maintain stability on the borders of the EU/WEU 
member states, to say nothing of the capacity to project force beyond the Balkans.25 
In June 1997, the EU members, who were in the process of updating and 
strengthening the Maastricht Treaty, signed the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was ratified 
by the member nations and came into force in 1999. In the area of common defense 
policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference to the "Petersberg tasks" and 
authorized the adoption of EU common strategies. The treaty also included the creation 
of the position of a "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy,"26 a 
eds. Rob De Wijk et al., (Royal Netherlands Military Academy), p.73. 
23
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Switzerland., 21/22 August 1998, Available [Online]: 
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13 
position that was not filled until September 1999, when former NATO Secretary-General 
Javier Solana accepted the position. 
B.       BLAIR INITIATIVE 
In the autumn of 1998, the discussion on European defense was changed 
profoundly when British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to push for a European 
Union role in defense. Blair first articulated his ideas at an informal EU summit in 
Pörtschach, Austria, in October 1998.27 Tony Blair was making a significant change in 
Britain's traditional anti-integration policy in defense matters by announcing Britain's 
willingness to realize an effective CFSP (Common Foreign Security Policy) within the 
framework of the European Union, provided it was militarily sound, intergovernmental in 
nature and not harmful to Atlantic solidarity.28 Blair reaffirmed his approach on 3 
November 1998 in a major address to the North Atlantic Assembly's annual session in 
Edinburgh, Scotland. Blair, complaining that Europe's ability for autonomous military 
action was so limited, called for major institutional and resource innovations to make 
Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic Alliance.29 This was a profound change 
in Britain's policy toward the ESDP. The reasons behind the change was considered 
curious since nobody expected such a move from London. 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom had opposed the idea of creating a European 
defense system autonomous from the transatlantic alliance. The United Kingdom had 
scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm accessed on December 14, 2000. 
27
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shared US skepticism regarding initiatives that might create splits between the United 
States and Europe in the Alliance, particularly those with roots in French neo-Gaullist 
philosophy.30 European Union nations' lack of political will and their inability to conduct 
military operations independently from NATO were frustrating, but the United Kingdom 
also had another reason for this change of policy. Britain had learned a lesson: to shape 
Europe's future according to British interests and in order to avoid its unwanted side 
effects, Britain had to remain engaged to the EU and had to lead the European integration 
process.31 Shunning the EMU by not participating in the Euro, Blair's government 
viewed the "defense pillar" of the union as a suitable area to remain critically engaged 
and even, considering Britain's "military superiority" over other European countries, to 
lead the integration of the European Union.32 In parallel with that, some analysts said that 
Blair wanted to demonstrate a commitment to Europe at a time when the United 
Kingdom was not going to join in the inauguration of the Euro.33 
Consequently, at a regular French-British Summit, Blair met with President 
Jacques Chirac at St. Malo in early December 1998. The declaration, named after this 
French resort, envisioned creating a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with 
the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act "autonomously," should 
29
 Ibid, p.5. 
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NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action.34 It is said that 
the French delegation reportedly had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder before the meeting, giving the declaration even more weight.35 The St. Malo 
declaration marked a watershed event in the ESDP process. 
The declaration emphasized the European Union's role on the international stage 
and the need for strengthened armed forces that could react rapidly to the new risks, and 
which were supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and 
technology. The Union had to have appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of 
situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without 
unnecessary duplication. The declaration also pointed out the need for an 
intergovernmental institution that would enable the Union to have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.36 
However, this institution would not change the EU countries' position in other 
European security institutions. The NATO and WEU collective defense commitments of 
the EU members had to be maintained, obligations to NATO honored, and the various 
positions of European states in relation to NATO and otherwise had to be respected. 
http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/ chai38ex.htm Accessed on November 1, 2000. 
34
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These developments had some repercussions on the other side of the Atlantic. As 
a reflection of US concerns (then) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, formally 
declared the US Administration's support for the initiative. For a long time the United 
States had been quite critical of Europe's lack of military capabilities and urged them to 
increase their defense expenditures, but cautioned the Europeans against "the three D's": 
duplication, decoupling, and discrimination}1 Secretary Albright would also emphasize 
these concerns at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the 
St. Malo meeting. 
According to Albright, the Allies should not duplicate what was already being 
done effectively in NATO. This would be a waste of defense resources at a time when 
defense spending in most European nations was declining. More fundamentally, the new 
European initiative should not in any way "decouple" or "de-link" the United States from 
Europe in the Alliance, or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through 
NATO. This could result from a lack of candor and transparency that the United States 
feared might be an intended or unintended consequence of the new European approach. A 
tendency to "gang up on" the United States, or just the US perception of such an 
occurrence, could surely spell the end of the Alliance. Finally, Albright insisted that there 
be no discrimination against NATO Allies who were not members of the European 
Union. This point -applied in particular to Turkey, but also to European Allies, Norway, 
37
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Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as Canada and the United 
States on the North American side of the Alliance.38 
In spite of these footnotes to US support for the initiative, it moved ahead, in 
parallel with NATO's conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo, which intended to stop 
the Serbian atrocities in the province and to allow Kosovo refugees to return to their 
homes in peace. The Kosovo campaign justified and added impetus to the Blair initiative. 
When the numbers were totaled after the air campaign, the United States had conducted 
nearly 80 percent of the bombing, 90 percent of the air-to-air refuelling, and had met 
approximately 95 percent of the intelligence requirements.39 From the US perspective, 
the fact that the Allies for the most part were not able to contribute to such a high-tech, 
low casualty campaign validated the wisdom of the Defense Capabilities Initiative 
(DCI).40 The DCI, adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999, was designed to 
stimulate European defense efforts to help them reach the US levels.41 From the 
European perspective, the experiences in Kosovo clearly demonstrated Europe's 
(undesirable, and perhaps growing) military dependence on the United States, and the 
need to do something about it. 
In an effort to incorporate what the Europeans had done toward the ESDP and 
mold it to the NATO framework, heads of governments welcomed the developments in 
the European Security and Defense Identity, at the April 1999 Washington Summit. A 
38
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compromise was reached between the non-EU members and the EU members of NATO. 
They agreed that the European Security and Defense Identity would be developed within 
the alliance and modeled after the 1996 Berlin decisions.42 The Alliance was endorsing 
the Europeans to act autonomously; but the Alliance would retain the decision-making. 
According to what may be called "the right to first refusal" the issues related to the ESDI 
would be discussed by the Atlantic Council, which would decide if the matter should be 
pursued by the Alliance as a whole or left to EU military action with the help of NATO.43 
This was clearly constraining the ESDI within NATO and falling short of granting the 
EU the right to decide autonomously. Moreover, the presumed availability of NATO 
assets for European operations was also in doubt, since no one could shelter the EU 
against a veto by a non-EU member.44 Thus, the ESDI within the NATO framework 
began losing clout. This, in turn, diminished the hope to realize the European aspirations 
to establish an effective European security and defense pillar. This prompted the EU 
efforts to construct the ESDP within an EU framework. 
In the meantime, the German EU Presidency transformed the set of national and 
bilateral initiatives triggered by the St. Malo declaration into a formal European Union 
process.45 At the Cologne EU Summit of June 1999 member states decided to establish a 
permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and an EU Military Committee to 
make recommendations to the PSC. They also established an EU Military Staff, including 
42
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a Situation Center to transfer WEU assets to the EU, and they agreed to hold regular as 
well as ad hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC), including the defense 
ministers. Finally, they approved the designation of Mr. Javier Solana as High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, in line with the Amsterdam 
Treaty.46 Summit conclusions also included an Annex providing the guidelines and 
principles for strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense. 
By the end of 1999, the EU had tied a major package together based on the 
guidelines of the St. Malo statement. Javier Solana had moved from his position of 
NATO Secretary-General to the post of EU High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. In addition, it was agreed that Solana would become WEU 
Secretary-General to help pave the way to merge the WEU within the EU, as was 
confirmed at Cologne. Additionally Solana also served as Secretary General of the EU 
Council. 
In Helsinki in 1999, the efforts toward a European force transformed into a more 
tangible form. The EU members declared their determination "to develop an autonomous 
capacity to make decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and to 
conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises." They noted that 
the process "will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a 
European army." In addition, they agreed on a series of substantial steps required to 
implement their political commitment, including: 
•    cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be 
46
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able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one 
year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full 
range of the Petersberg tasks; 
• new political and military bodies and structures will be established 
within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary 
political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while 
respecting the single institutional framework; 
• modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the 
needs of all EU Member States; 
• appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European 
NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU 
military crisis management; 
• a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the 
Union and the Member States.47 
In Helsinki, the EU countries demonstrated the political will to create an 
autonomous ESDP. Consequently in Brussels in November 2000, in accordance with the 
so-called Helsinki "headline goal" the defense ministers of the EU member states took a 
major step in creating an autonomous ESDP by agreeing to provide a pool of about 
100,000 personnel, 400 combat planes and 100 warships to comprise the Euro Rapid 
Reaction Force, which would be a maximum of 60,000-strong at any time48. The 
European Union also invited nonmembers to contribute troops. On this invitation, Turkey 
offered to contribute a mechanized brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 warplanes, two 
47
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transport planes and a small flotilla of ships in return for an important role in planning the 
organization's military operations.49 
The "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration" recognized both the need 
for further strategic capabilities and "the need to further improve the availability, 
deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified if 
the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied." The 
declaration also touched upon the relations with NATO. It referred to the need for 
mutually reinforcing the EU's capability goals with the DCI without unnecessary 
duplication. It also ensured that non-EU members' contributions would be considered to 
facilitate their possible participation in EU-led operations in accordance with the Helsinki 
and Feira decisions. However, the declaration placed much more emphasis on the 
"preservation of EU's autonomy in decision making" and the capabilities that would 
enable EU "to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets."50 
C.       ESDIORESDP? 
As a result of developments between 1998-2000, though most of the analysts 
were still using these concepts of ESDI and ESDP interchangeably, by the end of 2000, 
ESDP became an EU project, while the ESDI was mainly a NATO one. Though the US 
arguments about ESDP remained the same as if it were ESDI, actually the developments 
triggered by the "Blair Initiative" substantially changed the nature of discussion. The 
Europeans had shifted the platform on which the European security and defense identity 
49
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would be build from NATO to the EU. Europeans managed to turn what had begun as a 
NATO project (ESDI) into an EU project (ESDP). The language of NATO documents 
was emphasizing on the capabilities and cautioning against "the three D's": duplication, 
decoupling and discrimination (NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson would then 
change the rhetoric from "the three D's" to "the three I's": inclusiveness of all NATO 
allies, indivisibility of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities51), while EU 
documents after St. Malo emphasized the "autonomy" and the EU-only institutions. The 
Cold War circumstances that prevented Europeans from having an effective ESDP have 
substantially changed and the circumstances of the post-Cold War security environment 
seem to necessitate, to contribute and even to accelerate the creation of a European force 
rather than prevent it. 
The speed of developing an effective ESDP has been breathtaking. In almost three 
years, Europeans have accomplished more in security and defense areas than they had 
previously achieved in fifty years. More importantly, the inclusiveness of the ESDP is 
unprecedented when compared to other European Union projects, such as a Single 
Market or the EMU, which included at the beginning only a plurality of members. These 
accomplishments also demonstrated that a relatively more integrated Europe can achieve 
even more ambitious goals that it could have imagined previously. The high level of 
integration and the remarkable success of the unification process during the 1990's 
played a decisive role in achieving such ambitious goals in ESDP. Clearly, the high level 
of European integration has been a greatly contributing factor to the speed and extent of 
51
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achievements,   yet  there  were  also   other  specific   factors  that  produced  the   St. 
Malo/Helsinki process. 
The first factor was the "American decision to tip the balance of US policy in 
favor of greater autonomy for the EU, primarily as a way of satisfying Congressional 
demands for burden-sharing, but also in the hope that this would relieve the pressure on 
an overstretched imperium with increasingly complex global security responsibilities."52 
Second was the long-standing French pressure to have a more autonomous European 
defense posture. Third was the "Blair Initiative" that removed the largest stumbling block 
in the way of achieving an effective, sound ESDP. And finally the humiliating European 
failures in dealing with post-Cold War security problems epitomized in Bosnia and 
reached to peak in terms of military capabilities in Kosovo. 
Clearly, these underlying factors mentioned above are sensible and the 
developments to establish a sound ESDP are head-spinning. However, they did not 
prevent, but rather raised a multitude of questions and concerns about the feasibility of 
the ESDP and its possible impact on the future of NATO. Although most of the analysts 
and commentators have been pessimistic about the feasibility of the ESDP and its 
possible impact on NATO, and believed that it would never be realized, considerable 
reasons for being optimistic exist. 
The next chapter concerns the question of the feasibility of ESDP and explores 
the reasons to be optimistic or pessimistic about its future. 
52
 Cited in Jolyon Howorth, " European Integration "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate 
Challenge?" Chaillot Paper 43, (Institute for Security Studies Paris, November 2000) p. 28 from Paul 
Kennedy (Note 65). 
24 
III.    THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ESDP 
Since the launch of a common European security and defense policy within the 
European Union framework after the Cold War, much discussion about the feasibility of 
the ESDP has occurred. This is partly because of the doubts emanating from the failures 
of such efforts during the Cold War and partly because of the uncertainty of the post- 
Cold War security environment. The literature on the ESDP focuses either on a 
pessimistic or on an optimistic view of a European security and defense posture. 
However, both groups adress various factors that either support or oppose the realization 
of the ESDP. This chapter examines those factors and the reasons for being pessimistic or 
optimistic about the future of the ESDP, stressing the US position on the ESDP. 
A.        THE REASONS FOR BEING OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF 
THE ESDP 
There are seven primary reasons for being optimistic about the future of the 
ESDP. First, the European Union's political will desires an effective ESDP. The 
European Union as a major economic player in the world wants to secure a 
commensurate political role on the international stage to be able to defend its members' 
interests and to confront any international crisis that affects it. Obviously, this could only 
be possible by being a military power as well as being an economic power. To make its 
voice heard, the European Union must put muscle behind it. Recent experiences have 
clearly shown that the European Union, although it is a leading world actor, does not, 
without a military instrument, really have the capability to make its presence felt in 
resolving of major crisis. There is a strong belief that the European Union's success will 
25 
depend on its ability to combine military and non-military elements to manage and to 
resolve crises.53 
A second reason for optimism is that, Europe has the resources, means, and 
economic power to create such accapability if it has the political will. The European 
Union with its 15 members comprises a population of 375 million while the Unite States 
has between 270 to 280 million. The European Union, as a whole, has an enormous 
economic dimension, which is, in terms of GDP ($8,053 trillion), only second to the 
United States ($8.5 trillion) and controls 37 percent of the world's total exports and 36 
percent of the world's total imports, while the US comparable figures are 16.5 percent 
and 13.5 percent respectively.54 The European Union countries have military forces of 
1.9 million versus 1.4 million in the United States and spend 60 percent of what the 
United States spends for defense.55 In an optimistic view, synergies, rationalization, 
restructuring of defense expenditures of EU countries coupled with an economy at the 
scale mentioned above should be sufficient to give the EU the forces it will require for 
"Petersberg-type" missions, if not for a collective defense. Furthermore, this could be 
done without having to increase defense budgets. " In the post-Cold War context, 60 
percent [of what the United States spends for defense] should be more than enough to 
deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe. After all, that figure 
represents one fifth of the world's military expenditure!"56 
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The third reason one can be optimistic about the ESDP is the fundamental change 
in the United Kingdom's attitude toward the ESDP. For a long time, some European 
countries led by the UK viewed an all-European force as a threat to NATO and feared 
that an autonomous European defense system would damage the effectiveness of NATO 
by weakening the ties with the United States. For those reasons these countries, 
especially the UK (fueled by long-standing "Euroskepticism") always opposed the ESDP 
and prevented its realization. Nevertheless, the UK under Blair's "New Labor" is no 
longer opposing, but rather advocating its creation. To some analysts the UK wants to 
compensate for having shunned the EMU with a commitment to Europe by leading the 
ESDP, one of the few areas through which the UK could be "at the heart of Europe." 
Some also argue that this position could also contribute to the UK's strategic value on 
both sides of the Atlantic, considering the UK's special position in the transatlantic 
alliance as the strongest ally of the United States while also being one of the leading 
countries of the EU.57 
A fourth reason to be optimistic about the success of the ESDP is that the 
continuation of the "Kosovo effect." Kosovo served as a wake-up call for the EU 
countries showing the Europeans that they could not even solve a security problem on 
their own continent.58 "Kosovo effect" was influential in two ways. First, after the 
disastrous and humiliating inability that was demonstrated in handling the Bosnia 
problem, Kosovo reaffirmed that Europe was in dire need of developing real military 
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capabilities and institutional structures for effective crisis management. Second, it 
demonstrated that in the unpredictable and unstable security environment of the post- 
Cold War era Kosovo-like contingencies have become quite likely to emerge and every 
nation should be prepared to deal with such contingencies.59 The "Kosovo effect" was 
the igniting motive behind the Europeans' efforts to establish the ESDP and seems to be a 
permanent factor urging the EU to acquire the capabilities and mechanisms for a sound 
ESDP. 
The fifth positive reason for believing that the ESDP will succeed is that the 
instruments created by the EU to achieve the ESDP goal, such as common strategies, 
common positions, and joint actions are on an intergovernmental basis. Thus, in the 
absence of any treaty-based instrument requiring the transfer of sovereignty to a supra- 
national body, the EU members do not view their national prerogatives as being 
challenged. This facilitates the development of the ESDP.60 For this reason, so far, in 
terms of inclusiveness and speed, the ESDP has achieved an unprecedented success in the 
European unification process. All 15 members of the EU are participating in the project, 
while no other project of the EU has enjoyed such full attendance or progress in such a 
short time.61 
A sixth reason for optimism is that Europe already has a number of multinational 
force structures for various purposes. Though some of them are still symbolic and some 
of them exist primarily on paper, at least there are some force structures to use as a 
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starting point. Examples of these existing forces include: France, Italy, Spain, Portugal: 
the Army Joint Rapid Reaction Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force 
(EUROMARFOR), EUROCORPS which is composed of France, Germany, Belgium, 
Spain and Luxembourg and has a strength of 60,000 personnel, and the ACE Rapid 
Reaction Corps (ARRC), not to mention the various bilateral/trilateral arrangements, at 
the corps level, and included lower force levels. With an effective planning and 
rationalization, these forces can be gathered to form a future European army.62 
The last and the most important reason to be optimistic about the ESDP is the 
remarkable progress European countries achieved in the integration and unification 
process. Most authorities realize that future "Unified Europe," "Confederation," or 
"United States of Europe" is impossible without a common foreign policy and a sound 
military power that would enable the EU to become a global player. The more integrated 
Europe becomes, the more increased the urge to have an effective ESDP will be. 
Furthermore, the successes in the other pillars of EU process will also be a strong impetus 
to establish an autonomous European army to make the EU a stronger global player. 
Therefore, as long as the unification moves forward, the ESDP is also likely to advance. 
So far, the EU has been very successful in forming a consensus on long-term policies that 
are making a measurable step-by-step progress toward a goal for which the means (and 
not simply the objective) are defined. This strategy has worked in establishing other 
pillars, and it seems likely to work in the ESDP. 
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The European Union process has always been a success theory of institutions.63 
The EU countries first agreed upon the institutions and the improvements followed. 
Although the debates on the ESDP emphasize the need for further capabilities rather than 
the institutions and even point out the danger of having institutions without capabilities,64 
the importance of institutions in the unification cannot be denied. Institutions matter for 
the EU in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norms- 
setting and institution-building. Since the 1980s, each new step in European integration 
has brought along its own set of institutional requirements. "Defence will inevitably do 
the same, all the more so because the EU is currently void of any defence culture: only in 
a specialised institutional setting will such a culture be imported into it, and solidify."65 
Additionally, as in previous stages of European unification, Jean Monnet's recipe 
of establishing solidarites de fait in order to ensure lasting progress, as opposed to 
attempting to resolve all basic issues of principle before starting to move, appears to be 
working. Having a high profile person like Javier Solana in the CFSP High 
Representative position is really a strong reason to be optimistic about the ESDP's future. 
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B.        THE REASONS FOR BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF 
THE ESDP 
The compromise reached between the United States and European countries at the 
Washington summit of the Atlantic Alliance clearly constrains the European Security and 
Defense Identity inside NATO, as noted earlier, giving it the right to act, but not to 
decide autonomously. What is suggested is that ESDI decisions will be discussed by the 
Atlantic Council, which will decide if the matter should be pursued by the Alliance as a 
whole or left to the EU military action (WEU-led operations) with the help of NATO. In 
this case, a presumption of availability of NATO assets for European operations is also 
clearly established.66 
However, no degree of previous commitment could guarantee the EU that a non- 
EU NATO member would not veto these assets for EU-led operations. More importantly, 
there is no guarantee whatsoever that the right quantitative and qualitative amounts of 
American national assets, which are not permanently available to NATO, will be made 
available to the EU on request-particularly if the United States is facing a major crisis in 
another part of the world. So getting the ESDP to work effectively under the current 
circumstances seems doubtful. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact 
there has been no serious threat to Europe's existence, so creating a European defense 
system hardly seems urgent. It is widely accepted that problems like Kosovo and Bosnia 
are likely to occur in post-Cold War era and the Europeans must deal with these threats, 
66
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but they do not impose a serious danger to Europe's existence and unless there is a real 
threat, the ESDP process is destined to be slow. 
Even if we admit that the EU nations are willing to establish the ESDP, a 
considerable gap between European and US capabilities still exists in terms of 
implementing strategies that call for force projection, as in the case of the Petersberg 
tasks. Although EU member states collectively spend some 60 percent of what the United 
States allocates to its armed forces, European countries, due to Cold War force structures, 
get a disproportionally low return on their budgets in key areas, such as procurement and 
research and development.67 In some areas the European allies have collectively only 10 
to 15 percent of the assets of the Americans, and sometimes less (e.g. strategic 
reconnaissance).68 With regard to the DCI, in the areas essential for implementing a 
military operation, such as deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, 
effective engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, command, control and 
information systems, the European countries' capabilities are simply inadequate to carry 
out the most likely missions.69 Substantial improvement is needed. 
Currently, European forces are manpower-intensive and unable to be employed, 
rapidly, at great distances. Taken together, Europeans spend less than the United States 
on developing and buying new weapons and equipment and training the people who 
operate them.70 As Heisbourg put it in, the reality is simply that the current state of input 
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makes it impossible to reach the headline target in a meaningful manner. A rapidly 
deployable, sustainable corps-sized force in the field requires the equivalent of a three- 
corps base;71 in other words, a ground force headline goal of 60,000 requires an overall 
force of at least 200,000 deployable soldiers and the corresponding air and naval 
components.72 If not more, from five to seven times the number of soldiers must be 
available for rotational employment.73 
Accordingly, in November 2000, EU countries announced their national military 
contributions to realize the headline goal of 2003. However, the offers at the Union 
meeting demonstrated that even this target is a long way from being realized. The total 
number of troops nationally offered was about 100,000 (half of the goal) along with 400 
aircraft and 100 ships.74 As a reminder, the EU countries currently field ground forces of 
1.1 million (out of a total standing force of 1.9 million), of which only a small fraction is 
currently deployable and sustainable in the field. Considering these facts, creating a pool 
of up to 200,000 deployable soldiers will be a long and costly task implying major budget 
reordering.75 
According to the experts, the most difficult problem to be solved, as everybody 
agrees, is the resources problem. According to Heisbourg, the headline goal 
corresponding to the most demanding Petersberg tasks cannot be met if: 
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• Europe's acquisition and material expenditure, at some $36 billion, 
remains at around 40 percent of the US level ($82 billion, equipment 
plus RDT&E): air transport, C3I and specialist assets, such as IFRP 
and OEW/SEAD are not cheap. They are indispensable for serious 
force projection; 
• Europe's operation maintenance (O&M) spending remains at around 
40 percent of the US level. The readiness and sustainability of the 
headline force cannot be adequately ensured under such a condition; 
• Europe's capital investment (including R&D) per military person is a 
third of the US level. This is a rough but not unrealistic measure of the 
firepower production per soldier. The same point applies to O&M per 
soldier, where the ratio is just as low.76 
In the light of declining defense budgets of EU countries and constraints imposed 
by the EMU, reaching these goals at least for the foreseeable future is cumbersome. 
European countries have much difficulty in convincing their citizens of the necessity of 
increasing their defense budgets.77 On one hand, the political agenda favors defense 
integration that will stretch defense budgets. On the other hand, it is unlikely that 
frustrated national leaders have the political capital necessary to convince their publics to 
invest their tax dollars in quantities that could close the technological gap and result in 
improved real capacity for independent military action. It seems unlikely that Europe will 
have more money to spend. Even France and the United Kingdom have proposed defense 
budgets that are essentially flat through the first part of this decade. Many EU nations are 
already struggling to live with the constraints of the EMU. At the same time, like all 
industrialized nations, they are facing enormous pressures to increase social and 
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entitlement spending. The budget picture will only grow worse over the next decade as 
European populations continue to age.78 
A further difficulty comes from the complicated security arrangements of member 
(or non-member) countries. There are six principle groups of countries with whom the 




Those members of NATO who will become members of the EU soon 
after the permanent ESDP institutions and headline force begin to 
operate: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. These countries are 
already Associate members of WEU. 
Those NATO members who have expressed no wish to join the EU or 
which have rejected membership: Iceland and Norway. These 
countries are also Associate Members of WEU. 
Those countries who are EU members but not NATO members: 
Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Finland. 
The group of seven countries, which are candidates for both NATO 
and EU membership, and may become members of both at different 
times and in differing order: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries are Associate 
Partners of WEU. 
Turkey, an essential member of NATO by virtue of its strategic 
location, military power and sheer size, is waiting for EU membership. 
It is also an Associate Member of WEU.79 
Finally, as a unique member, there is Denmark: an EU and NATO 
member, within the WEU only as an observer with limited rights and 
privileges. 
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To set the guidelines for the proper relationship with these countries is a vast 
challenge for the EU. The relations with Turkey have already caused a problem depriving 
the EU of desired automatic access to NATO's command, control and decision-making 
structures for EU-led operations.80 The problem will be further complicated with the 
future memberships of Malta and Cyprus, which are neither members of NATO nor the 
WEU. Shortly, both the enlargements of NATO and the EU present serious challenges 
for the ESDP.81 
The last and maybe the largest obstacle before an autonomous ESDP is the United 
States and this deserves to be elaborated. 
C.        THE ESDP AND THE UNITED STATES 
For many years the US has been critical of Europe's defense budgets and 
emphasized the need for creating defense capabilities that would enable Europe to solve 
its continental problems. Indeed the United States turned out to be right in its criticisms 
given Europe's inability to deal with several contingencies after the Cold War. Therefore, 
the US administrations have applauded the formation of the ESDP with the following 
hopes: 
1. The United States' Potential Benefits from the ESDP 
First, since the end of the Cold War and the dramatic decline in the offensive 
capabilities of Russian Forces, US defense planning has reduced the resources for 
defending its European allies against a major assault. The current threats (small-scale 
conflicts, peace keeping missions) on the continent could very well be handled by the EU 
80




members with the assistance of a few or no US forces. Even though Europe might not 
have the capability to assume the full range of the "Petersberg tasks" for several years to 
come, a serious European effort to develop and fund new capabilities could eventually 
benefit the United States by reducing the resources required for the most likely European 
contingencies.82 
The United States might also benefit, for these developments might provide 
additional capabilities for responses to conflicts beyond Europe. Many European 
countries have been reluctant to support military operation beyond Europe. To handle the 
security problems in the problematic regions such as the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East have been generally viewed as the United States's duty. Similarly, European 
countries for the most part have been unaware of new threats to security including those 
stemming from spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and ethnic, 
racial, and religious conflicts. A broader European perspective on security requirements 
and better force projection and sustainability would make Europeans more valuable to the 
United States in operations beyond Europe.83 
A third benefit to the United States would occur because greater European self- 
reliance and responsibility might reduce European resentment of current US dominance 
in continental security matters and this could eventually remove the barriers to French 
full reintegration into NATO's integrated military command structure. Furthermore, the 
developments in the ESDP within the framework of the EU could force European neutral 
states, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, to acknowledge their responsibility 
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for security and force them to make contributions to the continent's security. Even going 
beyond just contributing, these neutral states could eventually become NATO members 
strengthening NATO both politically and militarily.84 
2.        US Concerns about the ESDP 
The United States's concerns about ESDP could be summarized in a phrase 
known as "three D's": duplication, decoupling, and discrimination as mentioned 
earlier.85 For a better understanding, the folowing elaborates on why the United States 
considers these issues crucial: 
First, regarding "duplication," the ESDP could produce rhetoric, promises and 
institutions that would duplicate NATO systems but provide no additional capabilities. 
The United States supports the EU's wish to increase its capabilities and defense 
expenditures, but does not support new institutions that could complicate the decision- 
making process and confound the coordination between the EU and NATO.86 To 
illustrate, European countries continue to reduce spending on defense despite their 
rhetoric to the contrary.87 The developments in the institutions but not in the capabilities 
justifies US criticisms about duplicating of NATO systems. Additionally the European 
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create capabilities that are already available as NATO (US) assets rather than creating 
additional capabilities for NATO.88 
Second, in regards to "discrimination," the ESDP could create artificial divisions 
and distinctions among NATO allies, undermining NATO's political cohesion. NATO 
has proved to be efficient as an institution. Its members have already shown the required 
political and military will to make it work. However, the ESDP's exclusive nature has 
already caused some problems among NATO members.89 The dynamics of the new 
arrangements within the framework of the ESDP may deepen differences among the 
members again undermining NATO's political cohesion. The differences between the 
security needs and threat perceptions of EU and non-EU members of NATO could 
eventually undermine the overall effectiveness of NATO.90 
Third, regarding "decoupling," the ESDP could become a beginning point for a 
destructive EU-US rivalry thus ending the transatlantic alliance. There are suspicions in 
Washington that the ESDP would become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to 
differentiate its foreign policies from that of the United States. France's anti- 
Americanism is a well-known fact and the United States is concerned that France's 
attitude toward "US hegemony" will become the entire EU's attitude.91 Already there are 
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Hungary and Poland (countries waiting for EU membership) to support the EU rather 
than the US positions on the NATO/EU relationship.92 As former Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, Marc Grossman, confirmed, "There are some people who are 
demanding that EU candidates in Eastern Europe choose somehow between Europe and 
the transatlantic relationship."93 Additionally, the recent Russian support for the ESDP 
recalled all too clearly old Soviet proposals for a "European House" that excluded the 
United States.94 
Despite suspicions that the ESDP could be the beginning of a strategic rivalry 
between the United States and Europe, many US officials found these suspicions 
exaggerated. According to a former Clinton administration official, Ivo Daalder, who 
served on the Clinton Administration's National Security Council staff, "Washington's 
suspicions [about ESDP motivations] are not only exaggerated; they are fundamentally 
misplaced. Europe's problem today, as Kosovo underscored, is not its potential future 
strength. On the contrary, the real problem is Europe's actual political and military 
weakness."95 
Some scholars like Brzezinski warn that the concerns about the ESDP should not 
prevent the United States from supporting European unification.96 Professor Simon 
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Serfaty presented a similar theme in his statement to the House Committee on 
International Relations. According to him "Entering a new century, our main fear about 
Europe should be that of a Europe that is weak and divided, and our main hope should be 
for a Europe that does become stronger and more united."97 
At the final analysis, one could say, the United States, despite its reasonable 
concerns, supports the ESDP because it could enhance European security commitments, 
provide additional capabilities, enable European countries to handle their own small-scale 
security problems without undermining transatlantic alliance and NATO. Thus, provided 
that it has institutional links with the alliance, the United States is not against the ESDP 
or against an "autonomous" European security structure unless it undermines the 
transatlantic alliance. 
Nevertheless, an important point should not be overlooked. The ESDP, even in its 
most harmless form, will be a potential threat to NATO's coherence since the ESDP will 
make a distinction between "collective defense" and "collective security" missions of the 
Alliance. This in turn will create some division among the members. Everybody agrees 
that collective defense, although not of primary importance in the present strategic 
situation, is still one of the alliance's fundamental security tasks. By contrast, as the April 
1999 Washington summit made clear, regional crisis management by NATO occur only 
on a case-by-case basis. For the EU, on the other hand, crisis management in Europe will 
be a permanent function. The United States has no concern about such an arrangement 
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since it will provide the United States with the flexibility in its course of action and 
relieve it from the burdens of European security commitments. However any division of 
labor between NATO and the EU that would relegate the alliance to collective defense 
only, while leaving crisis management to the EU, would marginalize its non-EU 
European members.98 As shown in the next chapters this particularly applies to Turkey. 
As a European non-EU NATO member, Turkey, the subject of the second section 
of this thesis, has different concerns about the ESDP. It is against any form of 
"autonomous" ESDP that excludes Turkey. Turkey rightfully has its own concerns about 
the implications of the ESDP. To elaborate those concerns and implications, the 
following chapters examine Turkey's place in the European security system and its 
position regarding the ESDP. 
98
 Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: 'Separable but Not Separate?'" NATO Review, Brussels, Spring 2000. 
42 
IV.    TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
A.       FROM THE "OTHER" OF EUROPE TO "ALLY" 
Turkey's relations with Europe and its place within the European security system 
have gone through three stages." The first stage was before the modern state of Turkey 
emerged from the Ottoman Empire and began its role in the international system. Turks 
have been a part of Europe geographically since their arrival in Asia Minor in the 
eleventh century100 and economically since the fourteenth century with the first Ottoman 
grant of trade privileges to the Genoese in 1352, which also granted trade subsequently to 
Venice and Florence, and later to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the 
Netherlands in 1612.101 The recognition of Turks as a political part of Europe occurred 
only in the nineteenth century, at the Paris Conference of 1956, when the Ottoman 
Empire was officially included in the Concert of Europe.102 Until that time the 
identification of the Ottoman Empire and the notion of Turk were defined in terms of the 
adversarial "other."103 Turkey, although a peripheral European power like Russia at the 
time, was nevertheless involved in the evolution of European politics, alliances, wars and 
the emergence of the European states system.104 
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The second stage of Turkey's identification vis-ä-vis Europe came with the 
creation of the modem Turkish state in 1923 with a pledge to follow a path of 
modernization and Westernization. The beginning of the Cold War and the redefinition of 
what defines the concept of Europe in terms of what constituted the "West" brought 
Turkey into the fold. This led to the creation of a "Western security community" 
centering around NATO. According to Bradley Klein, it constituted a "project" to create 
a "Western system" through a variety of institutions which ranged from the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, as Klein maintains, the focal point of this 
system was the transatlantic relationship embodied in NATO for the raison d'etre of this 
system was preserving one "way of life" against another. In this sense, Turkey was no 
longer the "other" in terms of Western identification, but very much a part of this 
Western ideal as well as the security architecture that was established to preserve this 
ideal. Turkey's involvement with Western institutions, essentially, started in this 
period.105 
During the Cold War, Turkey had a clear-cut role to play. Turkey's commitment 
to NATO's collective defense effort was to hold NATO's southern flank against the 
Soviet threat. In doing so, Turkey was also to deny the Soviets access to the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, thus, contributing to the implementation of the 
containment strategy.106 Since the Soviet Union's soft "underbelly" was rather exposed 
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to Turkey, this also forced them to deploy a considerable portion of their military assets 
in the south comprising 24 divisions, which otherwise could have been concentrated 
against the central region.107 However, NATO's culture of "central frontism" prevented 
the allies from giving the credit to Turkey for this critical role.108 To understand the 
importance of Turkey's role in the Cold War properly, a former military official argues 
that "Turkey's military strategic importance of the time cannot be completely 
portrayed.. .without asking what would have been the consequences had Turkey not been 
a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, but instead a member of the Warsaw Pact."109 
During this stage, Turkey's security interests remained inextricably linked to 
Europe. The necessities of the Cold War security environment easily fit with Turkey's 
Westernization and modernization project, which started with Ataturk. This caused 
Turkey to become gradually more of a part of the European security system. Aside from 
NATO, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, the CSCE/OSCE, and an 
associate member of the EU and the WEU; thus, it subscribed to the same set of values as 
the Euro-Atlantic community. A significant number of Turks started to live in Europe as 
a result of the post-World War II flux of the Turkish labor force to European countries. 
The Turkish economy was essentially tied to Europe as over 50 percent of Turkey's 
exports went sent to Europe. Therefore, during that time, the peace and security in 
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Europe became of paramount importance to Turkey as the nation became a more 
integrated part of Europe.'l ° 
Furthermore, the increasing integration with Europe was something that Turkey 
had always wanted since its foundation: 
Turkey's incorporation into Western European security arrangements after 
World War II seemed to afford Turkey the European legitimacy it always 
sought. During the Cold War, Europe's identity was reinvented along 
security lines and the Communist bloc became the Other/non-Europe. As 
long as the line of demarcation was the Iron Curtain, realpolitik dictated 
that Turkey's Europeanness not be openly questioned.1!' 
The third stage of Turkey's role and identity vis-ä-vis Europe started with the end 
of the Cold War when the "Western security community," which was inherited from the 
Cold War, began searching for a new role in the new security environment. A collective 
defense to a common threat was replaced with the promotion of central Western values— 
that is, first of all democracy and free market economics—with an added emphasis on 
human rights. The security community used the institutions inherited from the Cold War 
as a vehicle to achieve this purpose, particularly to spread these values to the post- 
communist world.112 The shift of emphasis from collective defense to collective security 
seemed to decrease the strategic importance of Turkey in the Europeans' eyes.113 In 
addition to that, the promotion of these values, the discussions of NATO, the WEU, and 
the EU enlargements also brought the issue of redefinition of Europe to the forefront and 
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Turkey's place in Europe came under scrutiny. Further reflecting this point, although the 
reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance for Western interests in the Middle East gave 
a new momentum to Turkey's relations with the United States, it failed to produce a 
similar effect in Turkey's relations with Europe since it showed Europeans Turkey's 
Middle Easterner side and the extent of threats it faced there.114 
Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War substantially reduced the strategic 
importance of Turkey in the European security system in terms of collective defense, the 
new post-Cold War security challenges to European security still make Turkey a valuable 
strategic partner for Europe. European security is being defined in broader terms. In the 
new European security environment, the most prominent risks are on Europe's southern 
periphery and most of these contingencies are likely to happen on Turkey's borders, or 
nearby. Thus, in the newly emerging security environment, post-Cold War security 
challenges, such as ethnic problems, energy security, countering the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction and missiles, "congaging"115 Russia, drug trafficking, illegal 
immigration are some areas requiring cooperation between Europeans and Turks.116 
Regarding such problems, Turkey is very well located: 
Turkey's geographic location can be considered an enviable strategic 
military asset. It offers Turkey the option for acting either as a bridge or as 
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a barrier over critical routes of transportation, both maritime and land (the 
Straits and both the east-west and north-south). It provides an easy and 
short access to strategic natural resources. These used to be silk and spices 
in the past; more recently Middle East oil, and now Caspian and Central 
Asian gas and oil. It can also be an ideal power base for force projection in 
a universal way. As such, Turkey could potentially influence the Balkans, 
the Black Sea and the Caucasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.117 
In addition to potentially influencing its surrounding,118 Turkey from a systemic 
perspective, plays the role of an insulator, a peripheral actor in all of the security regions 
surrounding it, namely the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Its main function, 
in practice, is to separate other regional security concerns from each other.119 By doing 
so, Turkey plays a highly important role in securing the periphery of Europe. It stabilizes 
its region and prevents the problems of those three hot spots from being complicated by 
spilling over into one another. Other than the above factors, as stated by a former Senior 
Advisor to the President of Turkey, Turkey also: 
Acts as a model for the newly independent countries in the region and 
helps them to protect their independence and entrance into the 
international community, serves as a springboard for the progressive 
expansion of Western values deeper eastward and with its secular regime, 
it offers a dynamic alternative to fundamentalism.120 
Finally, Turkey's high level of integration to Europe makes it an important part of 
Europe without which European security is unthinkable. There are close economic, 
social, and political bonds between Turkey and Europe, which integrates Turkey so 
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strongly in Europe. The customs union with the EU in 1996 made Turkey "the 
nonmember country institutionally most strongly integrated with the EU."121 In 1998, 
about 50 percent of Turkish exports went to Europe and about 52 percent of Turkey's 
imports came from Europe.122 Most Turkish firms abroad are in the European Union 
countries and three million Turks live, nearly five percent of Turkey's population, 
forming the greatest number of Turks living outside Turkey.123 This number roughly 
equal the populations of some small Eastern European states waiting for EU membership. 
In one respect, the migrant Turkish population in EU countries can be seen as "an 
extension of Turkey in Western Europe."124 With its NATO membership, Association 
Membership in the WEU, and Association Agreement with the EU, Turkey has close 
political and military bonds with Europe. Furthermore, Turkey is also a member of the 
Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
and other politically relevant European institutions ranging from trade unions to political 
party organizations.125 Considering all these facts, one could understand how the security 
of Europe and Turkey is so intertwined that every nation's security is interconnected with 
the others. 
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However, despite the fact that their security is so entwined, the developments in 
the European security architecture after the Cold War have seemingly ignored Turkey's 
place in the European security system. 
B.        TURKEY'S  CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  EUROPEAN  SECURITY IN  THE 
POST-COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War (1989-91) marked the end of the greatest threat to 
European security, but it also brought a number of security challenges that had been 
dormant during the Cold War era. Without doubt, Turkey has contributed significantly to 
resolving such security challenges. Turkey joined and backed Western coalitions' 
positions in handling these challenges, rather than acting unilaterally, which could well 
be a complicating factor in the Balkans and Caucasus, considering its Ottoman past. 
Doing so, it played a positive role in solving problems. In addition to that, Turkey 
actively participated in military humanitarian interventions to deal with these problems 
by contributing considerable amount of military force, by sharing the economic burden of 
these security problems, and by accepting a substantial number of refugees.126 
Bosnia is a good example of Turkey's role in Western security. Before the 
military intervention in Bosnia started, the Turkish government received a lot of public 
criticism for not doing enough. Despite strong public pressure to pursue a more assertive, 
unilateral policy,127 Turkey aligned its policy with the overall framework created by its 
major Western allies and the UN Security Council. Consequently, in 1993, after the 
intervention started, Turkey contributed a squadron of F-16s to support NATO operations 
to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. It provided 1,500 soldiers to the Implementation 
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Force (IFOR), the UN-led peacekeeping force, and later 1,000 soldiers to the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is still there. Furthermore, Turkey is the main partner 
of the US-initiated "equip and train" program for the Bosnian Federation Army. The 
United States provides military equipment and Turkey provides training.128 
The Turkish government was also active in shaping the policy of the Muslim 
group of states called the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and kept this 
organization from developing a special Islamic approach and policy. The OIC contact 
group, of which Turkey was a leading representative, normally kept continuous relations 
with the international contact group in preparing the various international conferences 
that tried to find a way to end the Bosnia war.129 
Turkey also participated in the first crisis management mission conducted in 
Europe by a multinational military force composed of Europeans only. Turkey 
contributed nearly one-tenth (700 out of 7,000 troops coming from Austria, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain and Turkey) of the troops for the Italian-led 
peacekeeping effort in Albania, "Operation Alba," in 1997.130 Turkey, at the invitation of 
the Albanian government, subsequently sent a military contingent of advisers, together 
with Italy and Greece, to help rebuild the Albanian forces.131 Similarly, Turkey is 
presently helping to modernize Macedonia's armed forces. In July 1995, the two 
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countries signed a military cooperation agreement providing for the exchange and 
military training of military experts and joint military exercises.132 
During the Kosovo conflict, Turkey joined its European and American allies in 
their high-level efforts to convince President Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo 
and to settle the conflict by compromising with the political representatives of the 
Kosovar-Albanian population. When the violence continued and Milosevic refused the 
international offer for a peaceful compromise, Ankara supported stronger international 
measures against the Serbs and declared its readiness to contribute to such an operation 
with eighteen F-16's.133 Subsequently when NATO activities escalated, Turkey offered 
air bases for alliance missions and participated in air strikes with 21 planes.134 Turkey 
also accepted a considerable share of Kosovar refugees, up to 26,000 (among other 
countries such as the United States which accepted 20,000 people; Germany 40,000, 
Norway 9,000, Sweden 15,000 and Canada 5,000,135) many of whom joined relatives 
who had long been living in Istanbul and Izmir.136 
Other than participating in peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, Turkey is also a 
strong promoter of regional cooperation for security and stability. In this regard, it signed 
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a number of bilateral agreements in all fields of cooperation, including "The Treaty of 
Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security." with Bulgaria, Albania, 
Romania, and Macedonia.137 It has taken the lead in establishing a multinational 
peacekeeping force in the Balkans (the Southeast European Brigade, or SEEBRIG)- 
comprising units from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and 
Albania. Upon the invitation of the German presidency of the European Union, Turkey 
participated in the political directors meeting in Bonn/Petersberg on 27 May 1999 where 
the stability pact for Southeastern Europe was drafted.138 Consequently, in Cologne, 10 
June 1999, with those countries "who seek integration into Euro-Atlantic structures" 
Turkey signed the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe which aims at "strengthening 
countries in South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for 
human rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole 
region."139 
Complementary to its relations with Balkan states aimed at providing stability and 
security for the region, Turkey is supporting the creation of multilateral regional political 
and economic cooperation plans. With its functioning institutions, "The Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project stands out as the most comprehensive and 
ambitious regional economic cooperation effort" in the region. Although it did not 
former Yugoslavia fell under communist rule. 
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develop as envisaged in 1992140 and although it is still far from Turkish expectations that 
it would directly help to stabilize the region. Should it be improved, the BSEC could well 
be an important link between Europe and Central Asia and even an instrument for 
conflict resolution and regional stabilization.141 
C.        A TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: TURKEY, THE UNITED STATES, 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
An important factor that always has an impact on Turkey's relations with Europe 
is Turkey's relations with the United States. Considering the special relationship 
developed between the two nations in the post-Cold War, it would not be wrong to argue 
that the relations between Turkey and the United States is likely to have an impact on 
Turkey's position in the European security system. 
During the Cold War, the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey had a 
common foreign and security policy as mentioned earlier. All three maintained an 
overwhelming priority on responding to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War changed the security interests of these countries. 
The essential difference between the United States and Europe in the analysis of post- 
Cold War security challenges is that the United States shares with Turkey a view that 
security must be increasingly seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the 
European Union concentrate, primarily if not exclusively, on problems of European 
security.142 This has implications not only for the scope of the CFSP and the European 
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security and defense policy (ESDP) but also for NATO and for the future cooperation 
among Western Europe, Turkey and the United States within that structure. 
For the United States, Turkey is in the unusual position of being both a 
contributor to European security in a formal Alliance context and a partner in addressing 
wider problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of 
which lie outside the NATO area. Turkey is an "attractive international partner for 
multilateralists and unilateralists alike."143 US public rhetoric has affirmed Turkey's 
• strategic significance in the post-Cold War era. In the earlier part of the Clinton 
administration, US officials emphasized Turkey's role as a "front-line state" that is "at the 
crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian 
continent"144 More recently, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asserted that US- 
Turkish relations have "even more of a hardheaded, geopolitical, strategic rationale in the 
post-Cold War period than ... during the Cold War."145 As Makovsky points out: 
Post-Cold War Turkey is an important ally for the United States. Its 
manifold strategic roles are now widely recognized: a moderate, pro- 
Western state in an unstable area; a rare, probably unique, example of 
democracy, however flawed, in a Muslim-majority state; a supporter of 
Israeli-Palestinian peace and a pace-setter in Islamic world normalization 
with Israel; a base for Operation Northern Watch, which enforces a no-fly 
zone in northern Iraq, a key element of Washington's Iraq strategy; an 
ideological counterweight to Iran; a buffer against resurgence of Russian 
aggression; a forceful but pacific and anti-separatist advocate of the causes 
of besieged Muslims in its region (Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
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Kosovo), all of whose kin are liberally represented in Turkey's population 
mix; an important, non-Russian line of communication with the West, and 
to some extent a role model, for the still-unsteady Turkic-language states 
of the former Soviet Union; and a potential outlet for Caspian Sea 
energy resources as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.146 
Although Turkey's transregional position makes it a valuable partner for the 
United States, which has global commitments and interests, the same factor causes 
Turkey to be left out of regional European security arrangements. The EU, at least for 
now, does not want serious security problems and "rogue states" on its borders.147 Many 
Europeans fear that Turkish membership in the ESDP would expose them to new risks 
and could import Middle East conflicts into the EU. As a strategic analyst noted back in 
the beginning of the 1990's: 
As the half-century imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, Europe 
has lost a great deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of Turkey. 
Indeed, as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is 
a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability: a 
strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; 
a political liability because of its position outside the European 
Community [then] and its close bilateral relationship with the United 
States.148 
Considering EU's reluctance to include Turkey in the security and defense 
initiatives, this prospect seems to be proved. Other than that, the ESDP is an EU initiative 
and the EU wants to preserve its autonomy, yet one further difficulty comes from this 
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dilution of the ESDP's EU identity and considers that as a death of initiative before it is 
even born.149 
However, the United States wants to see Turkey in the European security system. 
One of the US objections to the ESDP: "discrimination," as mentioned earlier particularly 
applies to Turkey. The top American officials insistently breach the issue of the 
participation of non-EU NATO allies into the new EU security and defense structures.150 
The NATO officials and the United States support the Turkish position toward the ESDP 
and push Europeans to find a solution to relieve Turkey's concerns.151 As long as the EU 
needs NATO and the United States for its security, it will not be able to discard Turkey's 
demands on being included in the new European security and defense structures. 
As the third chapter of this thesis shows at least for the foreseeable future, Europe 
will not have the capabilities and forces that will relieve it from reliance on the United 
States for collective defense against Russia, (still regarded as a potential threat to Europe, 
despite the substantial decline in its military power)152 though Europe might have the 
capabilities to deal with contingencies such as small-scale conflicts and peacekeeping 
missions. For the other threats identified in NATO's strategic concept, such as large-scale 
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peacekeeping/peacemaking, ethnic conflicts, WMD, drug trafficking, religious 
fundamentalism and energy security, Europe still needs the United States and NATO.153 
The same defense and security needs are also relevant, by virtue of its geostrategic 
position, vis-a-vis Turkey. Henceforth, even if the EU denies Turkey a role in the ESDP, 
it would still need Turkey for its collective defense and security as it needs NATO and 
the United States as well. Therefore, it is unlikely that the EU will ignore Turkey as a 
security and defense partner and will be unresponsive to its demands. EU's messages to 
Turkey seems to justify this view. 
The messages conveyed by the top officials of the EU and the ESDP to Turkish 
officials aimed to relieve Turkey of its concerns by giving assurances that one way or 
another Turkey will definitely have a link with the ESDP and its sensitivities will be 
considered.154 Nevertheless, there is still no sign of an offer of institutional arrangement 
that will satisfy Turkish demands as being a full member of new ESDP decision-making 
structures. 
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V.      TÜRKEY AND ESDP 
A.        TURKISH POLICY TOWARD THE ESDP 
The end of the Cold War raised a lot of concerns in Turkish security and defense 
policy-making circles: with the main threat to Europe's existence gone, Europe's 
redefinition of its new security architecture could exclude Turkey. For this reason, 
Turkey initially supported the creation of a European security and defense identity since 
it would be developed within the framework of NATO, of which it is a full member. 
Thus, Turkey hoped it would not be excluded from the process. 
Indeed, Turkey could manage to influence the developments in the European 
security and defense identity. For example, during the discussions of the C JTF Concept, 
one of the most significant Alliance adaptations along with the "deputy proposal" to 
stiffen the ESDI, Turkey stood firmly against any efforts that could exclude Turkey from 
the decision-making process of the CJTFs if the operation were led by the WELL As far 
as NATO assets would be involved in the CJTFs, Turkey would fully participate in the 
WEU decisionmaking.155 Similarly, concerned about its place in the European security 
system and the possible implications of the developments after St. Malo, Turkey 
presented the issue to the Washington NATO anniversary summit meeting in April 1999. 
During this meeting,Turkey stressed the necessity of its explicit agreement with any 
decision of the NATO council concerning the use of alliance assets for European 
purposes. Turkish diplomats successfully enforced a change in the language of NATO's 
New Strategic Concept in which this right is implicitly acknowledged by a reference to a 
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case by case basis for alliance decisions. They also managed to change a paragraph in the 
Washington Communique regarding a more independent European role in defense. In 
both cases, Turkey tried to stop what it regarded as the growing exclusion from the 
emerging European security and defense identity.156 
However, the results of St. Malo disappointed Turkey. To Turkey's dismay, in the 
place of the NATO's ESDI project, today there is the ESDP, which is an EU project of 
which Turkey is not a part. Since it is not a member of the EU, Turkey has no means of 
influencing the ESDP's evolution. In addition to that, the nearly complete absorption of 
the WEU into the EU structures with no set guidelines for Associate Members deprived 
Turkey of its acquis within the WEU. In Turkish eyes, the worst case scenario had 
become a reality and Turkey became increasingly uncomfortable with the developments 
in the European security structure. Turkey tried to influence the process articulating its 
concerns about the developments and appealed to the EU for further improvements in the 
participation of non-EU NATO members in new EU security structures, but it could not 
achieve the desired results.157 Even the Turkish offer, upon EU's invitation to non-EU 
European countries, to contribute to the new European Union force with a mechanized 
brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 warplanes, two transport planes and a small flotilla 
of ships in return for an important role in planning the organization's military operations 
did not provide the desired results.158 
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Meanwhile, it became clear that the EU would not be able to have an 
"autonomous" ESDP outside NATO and would need Turkey's consent to construct the 
ESDP within the NATO framework. There seemed to be three ways to get the ESDP to 
work. The first was for Europe to increase its defense spending to achieve the required 
capabilities. For obvious financial reasons that was impractical. Second, was "smart 
spending" and restructuring. Europe could restructure its military by reducing territorial 
defenses, abandoning conscription, cutting back manpower levels, and building up 
volunteer forces able to operate at great distances. Finally, Europe could organize as a 
single defense entity within NATO. After strong US warnings that an "autonomous" 
ESDP would make the Alliance a "relic" of the past,159 a compromise was reached 
between the EU and the United States. The compromise stated that command and 
planning of such a new European force would be done within the NATO structure and 
this forced the EU to follow a mixed course composed of the second and the third 
alternatives listed above. In turn, the EU wanted to have an automatic access to command 
and planning structures of NATO and a list of assets available for an EU-led operation. 
However, despite strong pressure from the EU members of the alliance and the United 
States as well, Turkey vetoed such an automatic access to NATO planning structures and 
assets, arguing that these demands are against its security interests and contrary to what 
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was agreed upon in the 1999 Washington Summit. This caused some tensions in Turkish- 
EU relations and still strains the relations.160 
B.   TURKEY'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE ESDP 
Along with the United States, Turkey has been the most vocal country in the 
Alliance, warning the EU about the ESDP issue. From the beginning, Turkey wanted 
non-EU European allies to be involved in the new EU security and defense structures. 
After the EU accelerated the "autonomous" ESDP movement, Turkey supported the US 
position warning the EU about "the three D's": Decoupling, Duplication, and 
Discrimination. Since "discrimination" is particularly related to Turkey, its warnings and 
objections focused on the participation of non-EU NATO allies in the ESDP. Turkey 
shares the general concerns that the other non-EU NATO members have. 
After summarizing some general concerns, the rest of the chapter elaborates 
Turkish concerns. In addition to concerns regarding "the three D's," which are to varying 
degrees shared by non-EU Allies, there are some other basic concerns that are shared by 
Turkey and other non-EU NATO members. 
Primary among these several concerns is the fact that a non-Article 5, EU-led 
Petersberg-type operation may eventually transform into an Article 5 contingency which 
would directly implicate the security and defense of all Allies. Even if this situation does 
not transform, it may have an indirect effect on other Allies. It seems that any possible 
EU operation will employ the same sets of forces and capabilities assigned for the full 
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range of Alliance missions. Furthermore, an EU operation, regardless of the capabilities 
used, might affect the legitimate security interests of other Allies. Therefore, there should 
be a mechanism that would enable non-EU Allies to have a voice in this kind of decision. 
Considering the latest developments, the ESDP seems to affect Turkey more than 
any other member of the Alliance. For a better understanding, the rest of this chapter 
deals with particular Turkish concerns and objections pertaining to the ESDP. 
1.        Participation 
The developments since the British initiative and the Cologne Declaration on a 
common security and defense policy have significantly changed the current European 
security and defense structure. With the absorption of WEU structures into the EU, the 
debate on participation of WEU Associate Members in the decision-making process for 
EU-led Petersberg operations has become a question of including them in the new ESDP 
framework. 
Involving WEU Associate Members in the new ESDP framework has been of 
great concern, especially for Turkey. Of the Associate members, Turkey has taken the 
most pronounced stand.161 The approach taken by Turkey and the other Associate 
Members is significant: it seems that the political involvement of Iceland and Norway in 
such operations does not matter much as long as they are fully informed on 
developments. Iceland's unique position-it does not have any armed forces-gives it 
greater flexibility in its approach to the issue. Furthermore, Iceland and Norway have no 
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intention of becoming EU members, for the time being. Therefore, in principle, they are 
not enthusiastic about having that kind of relationship with the EU.162 
When it comes to the new three Associate Members, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland, three countries with a clear prospect of EU full-membership, they 
clearly do not have to worry about total exclusion from EU affairs. Nevertheless, any 
arrangement that will provide them with the means for further involvement in the ESDP 
framework in this transitionary period, before their full membership of the EU, will 
undoubtedly contribute to their capabilities for interoperability and harmonization with 
the EU in this field.163 
For the "other" Associate Member, Turkey, the issue is more complicated. 
Lacking the prospect of full membership of the EU, and being geostrategically located in 
a difficult region close to the major areas of crisis which might constitute potential zones 
for the exercise of Petersberg missions, Turkey apparently has different concerns: 
What NATO identifies as major risks and threats can be found in the areas 
surrounding Turkey: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
religious fundamentalism, illicit arms and drugs trafficking, political 
unrest, international terrorism and mass movement of refugees. Therefore, 
in this changed strategic environment, Turkey is concerned with 
suggestions of regional solutions or of the predominance of non-Article 
five operations. Turkey is not a country in the central part of Europe that 
enjoys the safety and security of its borders.164 
This statement clearly points out Turkey's grounds for seeking further 
involvement in all European security arrangements. Consequently, participation in the 
planning and implementing of all Petersberg-type operations that could happen in these 
162




major troubled areas is of great importance for Turkey-not only as a NATO ally, but also 
as a regional actor whose interests will inevitably be affected by further developments. 
Therefore, Turkey supports its cause more vigorously regarding participation in the 
decision-making process of EU-led WEU operations or any future arrangements made 
within the ESDP framework. It does so, unlike some nations, because these issues are 
crucial to its national interests.165 
In Helsinki in 1999, the European Council declared Turkey as a candidate for full 
membership of the EU, and declared that it would be given a pre-accession strategy 
without addressing any dates or perspectives in detail. Yet Turkey's full membership in 
the EU still remains a remote possibility. In these circumstances, the participation of 
WEU Associate Members in the future ESDP framework becomes especially significant 
for Turkey when compared with other Associate Members. 
2.        Preserving the Acquis within the WEU 
Turkish objections to the ESDP focus on preserving the legal and political acquis 
they had within the WEU structure. Incorporating of the WEU into the EU structure 
seemed straightforward to the EU member states. However, the status of Turkey, a WEU 
Associate Member is still unclear. As an associate member it enjoyed all the possibilities 
of participation in WEU activities from the biweekly meetings of the WEU council and 
having five officers on duty in the defense planning cell to the participation of Turkish 
Parliamentarians in the WEU assembly, which met twice a year. The only exception, 
although important, was the exclusion from decision making in the WEU council and the 
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exclusion from the collective defense clause of the Brussels Treaty. Even the dispute 
about Turkey's inclusion in WEU decision-making in case of using the CJTFs was 
solved: As far as NATO assets would be used in CJTF's Turkey would fully participate 
in WEU decision-making. Furthermore, Turkey was and still is a full embodied and 
entitled member in one of the WEU's sub-organizations, the WEAO/ WEAG—just as all 
NATO members. 
However, after the WEU Council ceased to exist and the WEU's functions were 
transferred to the EU Council, it was not clear if WEU Associate Members would have 
any input into the decision-making process, or even if they would be consulted at any 
stage of the EU-ESDP deliberations. For Turkey in particular, this is a cause of concern. 
Clearly, Turkey would like to have assurances at this stage, namely, that its 
political, institutional and legal acquis within the WEU be preserved. The Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG), Eurocom and Eurolongterm were originally 
bodies within NATO, and were transferred to the WEU. In these cases, Turkey was 
already a full member and participant. "Once these institutions of the WEU became 
absorbed into the EU, will Turkey's legal acquis in these bodies cease to exist?" a 
Turkish scholar asked.166 On the other hand, Turkey also had a political acquis within the 
WEU, as it held in the WEU Council since 1992. For example, Turkey was also a 
signatory to the WEU Declaration on the EU Amsterdam Treaty. From the Turkish 
perspective, the absorption of the WEU into the 2nd Pillar of the EU presents problems 
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regarding the status of its legal and political acquis with the WEU, since Turkey has no 
participation in the ESDP process.167 
3.        Strategic Balance with Greece 
Another cause of concern for Turkey would be the possible impact of changes in 
the European security and defense architecture to the relationships between Turkey and 
Greece. 
Turkey was concerned that it would have to confront all of Europe when it had a 
problem with Greece, for Turkey saw the European security system in ways that alarmed 
them. And they knew that Greece used the EU to put pressure on some bilateral security 
problems, especially on Cyprus. As a Turkish scholar, Erol Manisali put it: 
The EU will have the opportunity to pressure Turkey concerning her 
relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration by using the 
ESDP, as the Aegean and the island of Cyprus will be seen within the 
boundaries of the EU. Even today it is considered as such. The "strategic 
balance" between Turkey and Greece will be altered completely. While 
Greece is both in NATO and the ESDP, Turkey participates only in 
NATO. Greece will begin to use the EU militarily against Turkey.168 
The EU's more assertive attitude toward Cyprus problem also fueled the growing 
concerns. Assuming that it would be a "catalyst effect" in the Cyprus problem, the EU 
declared that it could offer a full membership to the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus even 




 Erol Manisali "Europe Forming Its Own Army, Turkey Excluded," Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, Apr 24, 
1999. Available at http://ww\v.turkev.org/news99/e042899.htm accessed on Oct 15, 2000. 
169
 Republic of Cyprus: "Accession to the EU is the Best Way to Guarantee Security and Prosperity 
Says Verheugen," M2 Presswire, Coventry, Mar 27, 2000. Available through Proquest. 
67 
they wanted to participate in Europe's common security policy.170 This situation has been 
criticized by some member states, as Thomas Diez noted, because: 
The Cypriot membership may alter the strategic environment of east 
Mediterranean to the extent that the EU's foreign policy and defence 
dimensions are strengthened in the coming years, with the formerly non- 
aligned Cyprus becoming part of a European security and defense identity, 
while NATO member Turkey may have to remain outside for the time 
being....171 
Nevertheless, the concerns of such scholars are somewhat exaggerated—at least 
for now and not thoroughly shared by Turkish decision-making circles.172 There are also 
good reasons for Turkey to believe that these developments will not have any effect on its 
relationship with Greece. The EU countries' traditional approach to the Turkey-Greece 
problems presently remains neutral since both countries are NATO members. 
The second paragraph of Part III-A of the Petersberg Declaration stressed that the 
security guarantees and defense commitments in the treaties which bind the Member 
States within WEU and NATO were mutually reinforcing and would not be invoked by 
those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between Member 
States of either of the two organizations.173 To put it plainly, this clause was included to 
prevent non-WEU member NATO countries and WEU full members from using the 
guarantees provided under these organizations against each other in disputes among 
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themselves. Under the tenets of this declaration despite Greece's objections, EU countries 
maintained their "neutral" position vis-a-vis Turkish-Greek disputes.174 Though as the 
new ESDP structures develop, there is no guarantee that in the long term this attitude will 
be maintained, it seems unlikely to change in the short term. 
4. European Vocation and Dilution of NATO Membership 
Another cause of concern for Turkey is related to Turkey's EU vocation. Turkey 
has always seen its relations with the European Union (EC-before 1993) as a natural 
complement to its relations with NATO. Indeed, in many respects the 1963 Ankara 
agreement was a result of the Turkish NATO membership. With this agreement, Turkey 
became an associate member of the EC, expecting that someday it would eventually 
become a full member of the EC. Turkey's ties to the EC were enhanced in 1970 by the 
Additional Protocol, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between 
Turkey and the EC. Relations with the EC, however, were always seen by Turkey in a 
broader political context—as part of the wider effort to Westernize Turkish society and 
complete the Atatiirk revolution.175 Unfortunately, these prospects were to be 
diminishing, if not destroyed, due to the military intervention in politics and the 
outrageous reaction in Europe, over a certain period of time. 
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War significantly changed the context for 
Turkish membership. Prior to the collapse of the Wall, Turkey's problems with the EC 
were primarily economic. Afterward they broadened as the EC (later the EU) began to 
put greater emphasis on political, social, and cultural factors. As Gulnur Aybet has noted, 
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"Not only the parameters of European security but also those of European culture were 
being redefined, as the division of Europe ceased to exist and Europe—east and west— 
was finding new grounds for bonding in historical, cultural, and religious terms."176 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War changed the primacy of institutions in 
Europe. The EU became more prominent and NATO more complimentary. For many 
years, Turkey saw its .place in the European security system as proof of its Europeanness. 
NATO membership has formed the legitimacy of this argument. Turkey has seen its 
position in NATO and the European defense system as evidence and justification for the 
necessity of its being in European institutions and as a ultimate guarantee of EU 
membership. After all, Europe's security needs in the Cold War had made Turkey a part 
of the European security system. Therefore, Turks have seen the inclusion in the ESDP as 
a "litmus test" of the EU's willingness to accept Turkey as an EU member. Because of its 
geostrategic importance, security issues were considered the first arena on which the EU 
countries would be willing to cooperate with Turkey. But the last developments in the 
ESDP disproved this belief to Turkey's dismay. Turkey's exclusion from the ESDP along 
with a remote possibility of the EU membership, decreased, if not totally destroyed, 
Turkey's hopes of an eventual EU membership. 
Additionally, Turkey views all ESDP effort as a detriment to NATO's existence. 
Turks think that sooner or later the ESDP will take NATO's place177 in the European 
security system, and they will lose their first class status in the European security system 
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provided by an equal membership in NATO to a second class status in European security 
affairs. Reflecting this point are the statements of Turkish Ambassador to NATO: 
We are not against a larger international role for the EU since it is in our 
interest to join an organization which plays an even more important role 
than it does today. But we are against arrangements that would give us a 
second-class status. At present, as a member of NATO, Turkey has full 
rights in all NATO initiatives and operations concerning European 
security. We believe that another European security initiative in which we 
will have less opportunities, less power, and less influence is not a good 
offer. We believe that there should not be any dividing lines between the 
EU member states and those that are candidates for membership. 
Similarly, we believe that there should not be two or more levels of 
security among NATO countries in Europe. The European pillar of NATO 
is not the European Union; it is the European allies, all European allies of 
NATO, including Turkey, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Iceland. There are six European countries that are not yet members of the 
EU and we cannot exclude them while talking about the European pillar of 
NATO.178 
Another problem could arise from the possibility that some central and European 
states would be granted EU membership before Turkey. Because all of these new EU 
members would automatically become a part of ESDP as well, they would have a higher 
status in European security affairs over a staunch, long-standing NATO ally.179 Likewise, 
if automatic access to NATO planning capabilities is granted to EU, as EU wanted, this 
will also involve the non-NATO EU states (so-called "neutrals" and "non-aligned 
states"), notably Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Austria, in NATO planning mechanisms. 
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In the Turkish view, this is another unacceptable consequence of granting automatic 
access to the EU while Turkey is being excluded from ESDP structure.180 
5.        The Need for NATO 
One of the important concerns Turkey has, though it has an indirect effect on the 
discussion of the ESDP, is related to its need to NATO's collective defense guarantees. 
Russia is no longer a systemic adversary, but it still causes more security concerns for 
Turkey than for any other European country. Admittedly, there is no longer a direct 
Russian military threat since there is no shared border between the two countries. In 
addition, Russia has become one of the leading economic partners of Turkey. And 
Turkey relies heavily on Russia for its growing imports of natural gas. Compared to the 
Cold War, one could say that Turkey feels much less threatened by Russia today. 
However, Russia's continuing involvement in violent Caucasian and Transcaucasion 
conflicts poses the possibility of Russian-Turkish conflicts, given the links that bound 
Turkey to many countries in the region. Furthermore, Russian troops continue to be 
stationed at Turkey's borders with Armenia and Georgia, which disturbs Turkish security 
circles. Turkey's concerns were further fueled by Russia's success at achieving some 
change in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty regulations about the amount 
of military forces and equipment in the flank zones, thereby making Turkey the most 
exposed member of the alliance to the "residual threat" of the collapsed Soviet Union.181 
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The rivalry between the Turkey and Russia over the newly independent Central 
Asian states, the unresolved issue of oil and gas pipelines in the Caspian region and 
Turkmenistan, and the Russian S-300 deal with Cyprus have also been other issues of 
tension in the two countries' relations.182 Additionally, Turkey is uneasy with the 
increased ship traffic after the oil transportation from the Russian harbor of Novorossiisk 
started since it poses a serious environmental threat to its most crowded city, Istanbul.183 
Turkey signaled that it would make further regulations on the passage through the straits, 
to which Russia ostensibly objects. Therefore, the straits will likely be another issue of 
discussion between these countries in the coming years. 
In addition to a "residual threat" stemming from Russia, with its exposure to the 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), religious fundamentalism, and ethnic conflicts in 
its surroundings, Turkey is also regarded the most threatened member of the alliance. 
Apparently, the end of the Cold War has also brought a divergence in security needs of 
alliance members, and it is imperative to remember an important aspect of this issue, as 
seen from the Turkish perspective. Taking it as a potential threat to the cohesion of the 
Alliance, Rob De Wick broaches the issue of different "zones of security," which 
emerged in the Alliance region after the Cold War: 
Turkey, which is in the zone of "maximum danger," will undoubtedly 
have a different threat perception than the Netherlands, which is the zone 
of "maximum peace." Turkey is likely to put more emphasis on NATO's 
traditional collective defense tasks, while the Netherlands will emphasize 
NATO's crisis response operations, including peacekeeping.184 
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This seems to be the case so far. 
Given the attitude of Europeans to Turkey's security concerns185 and considering 
the "different zones of security," which emerged after the Cold War, Turkey tends to see 
the ESDP under a different light as compared to other members of the Alliance. It views 
the ESDP as a threat to NATO and unless some sort of institutional links are created 
between the two, Turkey will continue to be wary about the future of NATO and its 
status within the European security system. The growing divergence between Turkey's 
and Europe's security interests could eventually push Turkey to act on its own to secure 
its national interests. Turkey's place in the new ESDP structures must be defined. 
Yet defining Turkey's status within this new institutional development is not just 
a matter of institutional membership status. There are also practical considerations over 
security interests. As noted earlier, in Petersberg-type operations, it is likely that for the 
foreseeable future, any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of close proximity to 
Turkey, as Turkey's geo-strategic setting is surrounded by turbulent regions, from the 
Balkans, the Caucasus to the Middle East. Therefore, any Petersberg-type operation to be 
deliberated within the EU Council in relation to these regions will have a direct bearing 
on Turkey's national security interests. This is an important consideration. Already there 
is a feeling in Turkish decision-making circles that NATO's European Allies are less 
sensitive to Turkish security concerns than the United States.186 For example, there is less 
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sympathy from Northern Europe to the threats Turkey faces from regional proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, whereas the United States has been more responsive to 
Turkey's demands for Allied support and cooperation in this context.187 
Although it is too early to say this, if the European Allies seem to be indifferent to 
the threats facing Turkey and if the ESDP's growth weakens rather than strengthens the 
Alliance, which has been the case so far, then, Turkey might revert to a renationalization 
of its defense, a posture highly undesirable for NATO or a future ESDP, since Turkey has 
demonstrated over the years that it is in fact a reliable ally in times of crisis in a turbulent 
region.188 All of these considerations tie in directly to the status of Turkey within the 
evolving ESDP. Therefore, the need to define Turkey's status and role in this structure 
and to find ways to tie Turkey to new structures as soon as possible are not only 
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VI.    CONCLUSION 
From the inception of NATO, the debate over a European force that would 
strengthen the European pillar of the alliance has never ended. The concept of a 
European-only defense has always been defined differently by various nations. Their 
expectations and goals were always different, yet the main themes of the dispute have 
remained constant. 
With a close look, one could see that throughout the Cold War years, since the 
first attempt to launch a European Defense Community (EDC), the discussion of a 
European force has continually comprised these elements: 
• Europe's inability to meet its security and defense needs, 
• Europe's  over dependence  on  the United  States  for its  defense  (Considered 
humiliating by countries such as France), 
• Europe's inability to cooperate (lack of political will and unity), 
• Rebalancing the burden sharing, 
• Keeping the United States engaged in European affairs, 
• Containing the Soviet threat, 
• Integrating Germany in the European security system, 
• Determining who would be included, 
Considering the developments of the last ten years in forming a European force 
and the rhetoric behind it, the main discussion is the same as it was during the Cold War. 
Despite the fact that the Soviet threat to its existence has vanished, the last decade 
showed that Europe still does not have the means to deal with its security and defense 
problems. There is a strong need for further capabilities that would enable Europe to act 
on its own, but Europe still lacks the money to realize this. The efforts to solve this 
problem should still consider the need to preserve the transatlantic link. 
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The greatest change in these elements was the collapse of the Soviet Union. This 
removed the threat that tied Europeans' hands, making the United States "indispensable" 
for their defense for fifty years. The need for US leadership and engagement in European 
security affairs is still relevant given the inability of Europeans during the last decade to 
handle their continental problems. The expectations, aims, and intentions of the different 
players are still various and complex. For example, the United Kingdom's and 
Germany's perceptions of the ESDP are substantially different from the French 
perception. While the French view the ESDP as a way of decreasing the US influence in 
European affairs, the United States still views the ESDP as a way of realizing the long 
desired fair burden-sharing by leading Europeans to create extra capabilities, and thus to 
spend more. Therefore, considering these facts, it would not be wrong to say that despite 
the remarkable changes in the security environment by the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the controversy over the European force has remained the 
same. However, this is not to say that the fate of the ESDP will be as unsuccessful as the 
previous attempts. The ESDP seems to be an evolving process. It is too early to predict its 
future. 
As we go into a new decade, the ESDP seems to be an evolving process, and it 
will continue to evolve for at least another twenty years. There has been much debate 
about the ESDP both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic. The uncertainties of 
the new security environment and the institutional ambiguities of the ESDP are the major 
reasons creating those discussions. Considering these uncertainties and ambiguities, 
nobody could predict where the ESDP might go. However as shown in this thesis, some 
significant issues came to the fore, as a consequence of the process starting with St. Malo. 
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The most significant feature of the developments of the last two or three years is that 
today the EU has a much more "autonomous" prospect of European security and defense 
identity when compared to what was envisaged with the ESDI back in 1994. However, 
the question is how this will be done without causing harm to the transatlantic alliance. 
The last three years made it clear that if Europeans hope to create an 
"autonomous" ESDP, this cannot be done without creating some level of decoupling, 
duplication, and discrimination. Therefore, "doing it right" became the most important 
point to be considered. 
Everybody agrees that if it is done right, the EU's creating an autonomous ESDP 
establishment of a military crisis management capability for situations where NATO as a 
whole chooses not to engage could benefit the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship. 
If it is done correctly, the ESDP could expand the pool of forces and could rectify some 
of Europe's capability gaps. It could further help to rationalize and to redirect resources, 
resulting in a more balanced burden-sharing, and leading to a genuine strategic 
partnership between the EU and NATO. Nonetheless, if it is done poorly, this new 
venture could divide the transatlantic Alliance, could diminish the European capacity to 
manage crises, and could weaken Alliance cohesion and solidarity. 
The warnings that the ESDP should not create new institutions in the European 
security system, but rather should focus on increasing the capabilities overlook the 
importance of institution-building for the European integration process. Considering the 
EU's unification history, it is very likely that Europeans will first create the required 
institutions, and then they will go forward and will focus on the capabilities, not the 
reverse. So far, this has been the case and is likely to remain so in the near future. 
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The latest developments have clearly revealed EU members' political will to 
construct an autonomous ESDP. As long as British support for the initiative continues — 
and it seems likely that it will—along with France and Germany's support, the ESDP 
could well be realized and could give the Europeans the capability to deal with any 
contingencies on the continent. Nevertheless, the latest developments have also showed 
that, at least for the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely for the EU to secure the money, 
the political cohesion and military capabilities that would enable it to deal with 
Petersberg-type contingencies. Thus, NATO is likely to continue to be "the only game in 
the town," not only for collective defense needs but also for collective security needs. 
How Turkey will fit into the new European security system will depend on its 
European membership process, its unique geostrategic position and its special 
relationship with the United States. As long as Europe needs NATO and the United 
States for its collective defense, it will also need to consider Turkey's concerns and 
demands and try to integrate Turkey to the new ESDP structures. These links are unlikely 
to be institutional and, in a manner of speaking, that would mean a "backdoor entrance" 
to the EU. Furthermore, Turkey should not expect to have a full role in the decision- 
making process of the ESDP, as it wanted, since the ESDP is an EU project and EU 
countries would never do that in order to preserve the EU institutions' autonomy. 
Likewise, the EU should not expect Turkey to agree on automatic access to NATO 
planning structures and assets and to remove its veto, as the EU wanted, since this would 
mean a dilution in Turkish membership in NATO. The Turks will not agree to a second- 
class status in the Alliance. Indeed, both sides have legitimate arguments, both sides need 
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to reconsider their positions and must compromise, if a solution is to be found to the 
current problem. 
In order to ensure that there is a reciprocal benefit and, indeed, to move the ESDP 
process forward at all, the EU must resolve the participation issue. It should ensure the 
regular involvement of non-EU Allies in shaping the strategy and in conducting the 
military planning for EU-led operations and exercises affecting their security. The EU's 
Nice conclusions were a generous start, but they have not settled the issue. Turkey as a 
non-EU European Ally has pledged significant assets and capabilities to the EU's 
Headline Goal. It has an Article-5 security obligation that could be triggered if EU-led 
operations should escalate. It has proven its worth as a stalwart partner in actual 
European crises, and continues to do so. 
Turkey's identity in terms of the political and cultural evolution of post-Cold War 
Europe has come under scrutiny, yet a European security architecture cannot be 
envisaged without Turkey. Assuming that Turkey's strategic importance for Europe has 
decreased is wrong. Security in the post-Cold War era is no longer identified in terms of 
building a massive collective defense against an identifiable enemy. Instability, national 
movements, the control of natural resources in regions of turmoil all have and are likely 
to continue to have a bearing on European security interests. In this context, Turkey's 
geostrategic importance for Europe has, if anything, increased. A country with 
democratic institutions (which may not satisfy the EU criteria for the moment, but are 
nevertheless democratic), a country with a competitive free-market economy, a country 
which refrains from unilateral action in times of crisis and works through institutional 
and diplomatic channels as part of the Western system, a country which has a long- 
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Standing working relationship with Western institutions in a region of instability hosting 
vital strategic natural resources, such as oil and gas, has to remain part of the European 
security architecture; any other alternative would be detrimental to European security 
interests. 
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